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As both the national staple food and primary smallholder crop, maize occupies
a central position in Zambia’s agricultural political economy. Despite the
government’s large subsidies, maize productivity levels remain way below global
averages, maize commercialisation in the smallholder sector remains highly
concentrated, maize meal prices are highly volatile, and rural poverty remains
high. This study uses a political economy framework to better understand the
policy-making process, power structures and dynamics involved in the maize
sector in order to get a better understanding of who holds the keys to change,
to map the linkages of key players in order to determine critical nodes of policy
change. The Executive (Cabinet/State House) was found to wield the most power
in commanding the other actors in the sector. However, powerful lobby groups
with links to the Executive have often opposed changes to the sector to maintain
large rents to their constituency with disregard to the negative effects on the whole
sector. In addition, a “Command Triangle” which holds the keys for sustainable
of thePresident, Minister of Finance and Minister of Agriculture. Hence, in order
to bring about long-lasting changes to maize marketing policies in Zambia, there
is a need for strong collective action within the command triangle, as it possesses

Key words:
Zambia, maize politics, Net-Map procedure, lobbying linkages, command
linkages, VisualLyzer software
Introduction
For decades, maize has occupied a central position in Zambia’s agricultural
political economy. The political importance of maize can be traced back to the
early colonial period, with maize input and output price subsidies being the
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hallmarks of the country’s policy approach. The food riots experienced when
supplies ran short in 1986 and again in 1989 have not been easily forgotten by
either the people or political leaders. Nevertheless, is it just because politicians
fear shortages in the basic foodstuff that the commodity is politicised, or are
there other underlying factors? The answer to this question is complex.
Maize and other basic food staples are rain fed, thus their production is
susceptible to variations in weather. This means that production volumes tend

if left unregulated.Also, basic foods are quite inelastic in their demand, and
economies including Zambia. For these reasons alone, politicians often become
nervous about the prospects of either low prices (too many farmers will suffer)
or high prices (fear of consumer rage), the usual food price dilemma. Therefore,
they tend to advocate for subsidies when perhaps it might be wiser if they did
not. However, despite the evidence that the intervention programmes—the
Food Reserve Agency (FRA) and Farmer Input Support Programme (FISP)—do
not manage to effectively reach the poor, it is probable that most people still
believe that they do. This is because once the government becomes involved in
food market opportunities, certain operators take advantage of the subsidies
and, hence, the incentive to sustain government interventions beyond what
makes technical sense becomes stronger.
Discretionary and unpredictable FRA intervention continues to be the greatest
policy problem plaguing the maize marketing system and food security in Zambia.
Generally, the actual and potential government interventions by the FRA generate
private sector uncertainties and inaction leading to a cycle of recurrent need for
government intervention. All this comes at a huge expense to the treasury and causes

broad-based agricultural growth because little money is going to key drivers of
agricultural growth such as rural infrastructure (roads, rail, and telecommunication),
agricultural research and development, market information, irrigation, institutions
that foster the development of effective markets, and complementary services such
as agricultural extension and credit (Chapoto et al., 2015).
Apart from the politicised maize policies, Zambia’s trade policy has also
been highly unstable. Stop-go trade policies have led to skyrocketing consumer
prices and increased informal trade, suggesting that Zambia is failing to take
advantage of regional markets and opportunities to increase tax collection.
Chapoto and Jayne (2009) show that countries (including Zambia) that had
unpredictable maize marketing and trade policies had the highest price
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variability and unpredictability compared to countries that had an open border
whereas countries like Zambia continued to be in panic mode resulting in ‘kneejerk’ policies that curtail meaningful agriculture growth.
As a result of the deeply political nature of maize in Zambia, and the extensive
private sector has tended to take a cautious approach to investing in the sector.
At the same time, maize productivity levels remain way below global averages,
maize commercialisation in the smallholder sector is highly concentrated, maize
meal prices are highly volatile, and rural poverty remains high. The combination
of these factors suggests an urgent need for policy change. Therefore, the main
question is how the government can help unlock the potential of the Zambian
agriculture sector to achieve meaningful pro-poor agricultural growth.
Behind this backdrop, this study explores the political economy networks
that have maintained maize as the primary focus of Zambian agricultural policy
status quo. We utilised
a participatory interview-based mapping method called Net-Map (Schiffer and
Hauck, 2010) to help understand and visualise the political dynamics of maize
in Zambia, and identify the main key forces of change, their primary policy
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 discusses the
evolution of the maize marketing and trade policies in Zambia; Section 3
presents the data and methods; Section 4 uses the Net-map procedure to help
understand the political economy issues in the maize sector in order to identify
the key levers for policy change; and Section 5 concludes and presents some
recommendations on how to reform the maize sector.
The History of Maize in Zambia
Pre-Independence period
In order to fully understand Zambia’s maize-centric policies since gaining
independence in 1964, we need to start by understanding what the maize product
is and how it came to be popular in Zambia. Maize in all of its varieties has its
African shores from about 1500 onwards. At that time, millet and sorghum were
the cereal subsistence staples of African populations, and were not replaced by
maize for many centuries. What led to an expansion in maize production was its
relative suitability to commercial production. It was easily cropped, came with a
series of variety improvements developed in America and Australia, and matured
relatively quickly compared with sorghum and millet, thus requiring less labour
and producing better value productivity (McCann, 2001).
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These physical attributes made maize suitable from two perspectives. Firstly,
while it did not lend itself especially well to subsistence farming (though some
African farmers did produce the crop with success) it suited commercial farming,
and therefore, almost exclusively maize was produced by white commercial
farmers. Secondly, it produced a basic food that lent itself to the growing demand
from migrant labourers working in the expanding mines of South Africa, as well as
from the then Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia). Maize was provided on contract
to the mines, who distributed it as rations to their employees.
Maize, a crop which had been referred to as food for Europeans in the
1930s, was the food of choice for most Zambians by the time of independence in
1964 (McCann, 2001). Independent Zambia was, therefore, heavily reliant upon
maize as a staple food; according to JAICAF (2008) over 60% of land planted to
major crops at this time was under maize. But the way in which this expansion
was achieved was highly favourable to white commercial farmers.
The great depression of 1933 did not spare the mining sector in Northern
Rhodesia. Many new mines on the growing Copperbelt were closed at precisely
the time good weather yielded a bumper harvest. This was also exacerbated
(for the whites that is) by an expansion in African production on the Tonga
Plateau, where ox-drawn plough technology was enhancing production and
particular was threatened. The solution was to introduce market controls. The
Agricultural Advisory Board established a Maize Control Board. Farmers were
required to sell to this Board, which would then be responsible for onward sale,
including exports and imports when necessary. In addition, the Board stipulated
that a minimum of three parts of total maize bought (by farmer revenue) and
a maximum of one part would go to white commercial farmers and African
farmers respectively. Effectively, the white commercial farmers were legislating
against any expanded competition from African competitors (Vickery, 1985). In
not join cooperatives established for the purpose of expanding markets.1
years, Northern Rhodesia failed to produce enough to satisfy urban demand, and
imports were required, mainly from the South. Prices to the mining companies
rose, and they lobbied hard for reductions, and from this point on the Board
began to subsidise consumers, and so operated at a loss. By the late 1950s and
early 1960s production was in surplus again, but a political culture of support for
white farmers and subsidies for the operation of the mines had been established
as part of the expected political landscape. Preferential treatment of the white
farmers continued more or less right up to the end of the colonial period.
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Post-Independence period
After independence, the political objectives changed. The Frontline States, a loose
coalition of African countries from the 1960s to the early 1990s committed to
ending apartheid and white minority rule in South Africa and Rhodesia,imposed
sanctions against the Smith Regime in Southern Rhodesia that made it politically
unpalatable for members to commercially source maize in years of shortage.
Zambia now became relatively dependent upon smaller farmers to provide
what had become its basic food, and was in any case politically committed to
supporting indigenous smallholder farmers, and redressing their discriminatory
exclusion from markets.
In this environment, Zambia started to establish rural crop-buying
stations, which were formed under the National Agricultural Marketing
Board (NAMBOARD) in 1969. Maize as a staple continued to receive major
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Cooperatives were established with a view (initially) towards improving access
for smallholder farmers, both to inputs and to the market outlets according to
the willingness and ability to supply, unrestricted by quota. Import and other
controls were also imposed as a means of encouraging domestic growth. By
1970, these measures were beginning to have an impact. Whereas, up until that
year, domestic production had run at about 600,000 to 800,000 tonnes, by 1976
it was up to around 1,600,000 tonnes (Figure1).
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Figure 1: Zambia’s Maize Production from 1961 to 2014
Source: FAOSTAT 2013; CSO/MAL Crop Forecast Survey.
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The approach to maize subsidies in general hardly changed. The practice
of supporting farmer prices and subsidising urban populations previously
used by the colonial government was merely continued. What changed was the
withdrawal of pro-white discrimination, and Zambia now had a new government
devoted to promoting the interests of African farmers.
The approach to supporting production improvements was heavily
state-centric. The political philosophy propounded by the United National
Independence Party (UNIP) and its leader, Kenneth Kaunda, was socialist and
humanist, partly owing to the historical, anti-western position taken by UNIP’s
predecessor, the Zambian African National Congress (ZANC) and their approach
to building a broad social future for the mass of poor Africans, together with
the non-aligned or somewhat pro-Soviet position chosen by the liberation
movements. In this era, cooperatives were seen as potentially important
contributors to overall rural mobilisation and agricultural development rather
than just as member-based business organisations (Öjermark and Chabala,
1994).
Economic decline and political change
The early years of independence were reasonably successful, with annual real
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rates averaging 3.9% between 1965
and 1974, although this was only 0.6% per capita (Sousa and Fedec, 2015). But
subsequent nationalisation of various sectors, including the mainstay copper
coupled with the decline in the global copper price and the rise in the price of
oil undermined economic growth and government revenue.
The expanded recurrent expenditures by the government parastatals,
especially on maize subsidies through NAMBOARD and subsidies on mealie meal
prices, exacerbated national debt and contributed to increasingly uncontrollable
with GDP per capita running annually at around minus 2.5%. Food shortages
and price increases, as subsidies had to be rescinded in the face of structural
adjustment conditions, led to riots in 1986 and again in 1989. Under these
various pressures, but also apparently under the clear impression that he could
not lose an election, Kaunda permitted the registration of political parties, and
an election was called in 1991. In this election, Kaunda lost to the Movement for
Multiparty Democracy (MMD) under the leadership of Chiluba.
The approach to the economy adopted by the MMD was starkly at odds
with that of UNIP. Indeed, injecting change in this respect was a key part of its
agenda and appeal. MMD embarked upon a radical programme of privatisations
centred on the copper mines but also involving the wide range of state-owned
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parastatals under the Industrial Development Corporation (INDECO). Subsidies
and controls were removed, not just from maize, but from other markets as well
(Howard and Mungoma, 1996). The private traders and millers were expected
for them to meet the challenge. Interest rates rose to above 200% through the
early 1990s, and so the required investments in new business infrastructure
were not forthcoming.
Meanwhile demand for maize continued to grow, and the food shortages
and price hikes of 1986 and 1990 could only be repeated. This was exacerbated
by a severe drought in 1991, which caused production to fall to just over 500,000
tonnes, its lowest levels since independence. Throughout the 1990s, production
to weather changes. Many people concluded that the market had failed to yield
After failing in his bid for a third term in 2001, Chiluba was replaced by
another MMD candidate, Levy Patrick Mwanawasa who dubbed his government
the New Deal Government. With the economy reeling from the effects of market
reforms, the Mwanawasa government decided to re-establish maize input and
output support programmes. Coincidentally, Zambia like some other countries
in Africa had her debt forgiven, making it possible for the government to
implement these programmes without putting a lot of strain on the national
budget. Maize production began to recover and indeed, expand. Therefore, the
history both of food riots in the 1980s and of continuing poor harvests through
the 1990s imprinted on successive governments the need to intervene. The
subsidy programmes were ramped up under Rupiah Banda but could not secure
him the election against Michael Sata. Table A1 in the Appendix summarises the
sector.
Data and Methods
To address the objectives, the study uses a qualitative research method. The
key research tool utilised is a participatory mapping method called Net-Map
(Schiffer and Hauck, 2010), which allows for the collection of qualitative data
using a semi-structured interview approach. Net-Map, an interview-based
mapping tool, was used to help understand, visualise, discuss, and improve
2
. The tool can be
adapted to any situation, and in our case, was applied to gain an understanding
of the political dynamics of the maize sector in Zambia, identifying the main key
levers of change, their primary policy objectives, how they are linked, and their
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Semi-structured interviews were conducted with nine key informants
knowledgeable about the Zambian maize sector. The key informants were drawn
from public institutions, private institution, civil societies, regional bodies, and

or maintaining the current maize policies. They were also asked to identify the
each actor had in blocking or supporting policy change. From this analysis, and
in combination with our knowledge of the sector, we make recommendations of
who, and how, to change the current status quo in the maize sub-sector.

to as the Executive), Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock (MAL), Ministry
of Finance and National Planning (MoFNP), Zambia National Farmers Union
(ZNFU), Millers Association of Zambia (MAZ), and Grain Traders Association of
Zambia (GTAZ). These actors interacted in various ways, how they interacted

change, while the command linkage is when one actor instructs another actor to
perform or carry out certain duties/activities. To show these linkages between
the actors, social network analysis was undertaken on the aggregated network
data from the interviews with key stakeholders. The different perspectives of
the various informants were aggregated using VisualLyzer software to control
against potential bias (Schiffer and Hauck, 2010).
Results and Discussion
Key actors and the agricultural policy formulation process
Government: The agricultural policy planning process in Zambia involves several
different levels of government including the MAL, MoFNP, and the Ministry of
Justice. Any agricultural policy changes or new policies are communicated to
the Cabinet through a Cabinet memo. The Policy Analysis and Coordination
for review before the relevant Cabinet Committee makes recommendations to
the full cabinet for approval, and the policy decision is communicated back to
the ministry for implementation (Koenen-Grant and Garnett, 1996).3 Policies
that are approved by cabinet for implementation are usually administrative
policies. Policies that require enactment of new laws are taken to parliament
for debate and vote on the proposed bill. However, it is very rare that Cabinet
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recommendations fail to pass through parliament because debates and voting is
done along party lines.
the maize sector. Most of the agricultural stakeholders interviewed said that
any change in policy would need to start from the top. The rural smallholder
farming community is of great interest to politicians because they constitute
the largest voting bloc in the country. Hence, to win the rural vote, the politician
must win over the hearts of smallholder farmers by having programmes and/or
policies targeted at them. The fear of losing elections has contributed, in many
ways, to the high level of ad hoc maize marketing and trade decisions made
by the government. As an arm of government, the Ministry of Agriculture and
Livestock has often been forced to justify and implement decisions announced
from the top. , Maize sector policies can be formulated at technical level but
decisions are made at political level.
Zambia National Farmers’ Union: ZNFU was founded in 1905, and consisted of
large-scale farmers. Before independence in 1964, the ZNFU was called Rhodesia
National Farmers’ Union. After independence, the name became Commercial
Farmers Bureau. In 1992, the name was changed to ZNFU, to represent the
inclusion of smallholder farmers as members. Currently, it represents smalland large-scale farmers and agribusinesses. Its members are categorised into
district famers’ associations, commodity specialized associations, corporate
farming businesses, the agribusiness chamber, and association members. Some
of the union’s objectives are to promote and safeguard the interest of members,
to support the conduct and the development of the agriculture industry in
Zambia, and to make representations to the government or to any competent
authority with regard to matters directly or indirectly affecting agriculture (in
its broadest sense). One of the union’s core functions is to lobby and advocate on
when it comes to lobbying for change/no change due to its large membership
base.
Millers Association of Zambia: MAZ comprises more than 30 members
These members are located across the country though concentrated along the
line of rail. These milling companies tend to service mostly urban consumers.
Small-scale millers are not members of the association. MAZ tends to advocate
for cheap maize grain prices, and has been shown to have a lot of power in
chips. Government is usually caught in a dilemma of trying to offer affordable
maize meal prices and offer farmers a good price for their produce.
Grain Traders Association of Zambia: GTAZ was established in 2005 mainly
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to promote commodity trading, develop sound trading rules and regulations, to
encourage the development of small and medium traders and to work with the
government and other stakeholders to improve the agriculture sector in Zambia.
GTAZ comprises a diverse membership base of both Zambian and international
companies, some of which are multinational and regional players. Currently they
are more than 20 members trading in a number of other products apart from

distrust of private trade in general and in agricultural products in particular.
Lobbying network
Figure 2 summarises the lobbying network. The network shows that ZNFU

as they are seen to control consumer maize meal prices and, therefore, are able
to leverage politicians’ fears of escalating maize meal prices in order to lobby
for cheap maize grain from FRA, either directly to the Minister and/or the
Executive. Fertiliser companies have a lobby power almost equal to the millers
because they also have access to the Executive. Because fertiliser is big business
in Zambia, substantial campaign contributions by large fertiliser companies
are likely to enable these companies to have direct access to State House. Key
winning the FISP tenders, have this access whilst others do not, suggesting an
actors as there is a long-standing distrust of private maize buyers, hence the
grain traders’ advocacy efforts tend not to matter as much as those of MAZ or
ZNFU.
MAZ normally lobbies for cheap maize grain from FRA directly to the
Minister and/or the Executive. One informant pointed out that, “the ones
bargaining chip”. They tend to push the government to subsidise maize grain by
making FRA sell cheaper maize to selected large millers (MAZ members) with
the promise to reduce mealie meal prices. On the other hand, Grain Traders
represented by GTAZ support and lobby for an open maize market policy, which
cheap FRA maize.
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State House/Cabinet

Minister of Agric

MAL
MoFNP

Fertilizer
Companies

GTAZ
ZNFU

Millers
Civil Societies

Figure 2. Lobbying Network
Source: Authors’ calculations with VisualLyzer from interview data. Actors sized
4

one of them lobbies to reach their association’sl goals. In terms of the maize sector,
ZNFU tries to serve the interest of the smallholder farmers by lobbying for input
provision and higher output price from the government. However, in most instances
their lobbying has ignored empirical evidence that suggests that the majority of the
The fact that the interests of these key players do not overlap on a number
policy. ZNFU has in the past, been able to single-handedly lobby for FRA
producer maize price increases, putting them at odds with traders and millers,
who would rather have access to cheaper maize grain. However, as powerful as
the union is, there are times when things do not go its way. For instance, on 17
March 2015, the Minister of Agriculture announced the importation of wheat,
which the millers saw as a welcome move. However, this did not sit very well
with ZNFU which went to the extent of calling the minister, “minister of millers”
in an article posted on the union’s website expressing dissatisfaction on the way
things were going (ZNFU, 2015).
Within the milling industry, members of MAZ are seen to have unfair
competitive advantage as they are usually the ones who are able to access
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cheaper maize from FRA. However, the MAZ lobby success is usually mixed. For
instance, after the removal of the maize grain subsidy in 2013, it has not been
successful with its lobby effort to fully bring back the subsidy. The continued
tug of war among the different stakeholders makes policy changes in the maize
There are some areas of consensus amongst these players, for instance
ZNFU depending on the crop, can also work in tandem with the millers and
MAL. ZNFU, GTAZ, and some fertiliser and seed companies seem to have aligned
interests when it comes to lobbying policy change concerning FISP and for
Zambia to have a functional commodity exchange. Such areas of consensus can
be used as a starting point for pushing for policy changes in the agricultural
sector.
Command network
The results in Figure 3 show that the power to command actors in the maize
sector is centralised around the Executive. For instance, although FRA reports
the policies by formally and/or informally commanding both MAL and FRA
to implement certain policies. For example, during the 2014/2015 marketing
session, the ice resident at a political rally announced that FRA was going to
buy all the surplus maize from the smallholder farmers and immediately FRA
started buying more maize, exceeding the strategic reserve of 500,000-mt
target. In addition, in August 2015, we saw the resident announcing a higher
FRA maize price (K75 from K70 per 50kg bag) than announced by the agency a
week before.
MoFNP is the second most powerful, followed by MAL in terms of the
number of actors it can command. Thus, the Executive, MoFNP, and MAL form
a command triangle, which according to the various stakeholder interviews
possesses the keys to changing the current maize sector policies. At the centre of
the triangle is the Minister of Agriculture who has command over MAL and FRA.
However, the Ministry of Agriculture has been and is a revolving door, with an
informant pointing out that “no single minister has been able to last long enough
for change”. Since 2010, the inistry has had six inisters of Agriculture. Given the
status quo, the only way policies can change is if the Minister of Agriculture,
Minister of Finance, and the resident agree on policy issues. Together, these
three hold the keys for change in the maize sector.
Stakeholders also pointed out that currently the Executive makes politically
motivated policy pronouncements without consultation and these actions leave
no budgetary accountability to either parliament or the Ministry of Finance.
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Parliament on the other hand seems unwilling to hold the Executive accountable
for decisions that affect the approved budget. It was also noted that the actual lines
of command especially with the actors in the triangle are extremely convoluted
and unclear, which makes it hard to determine where an order comes from and to
hold particular actors and institutions accountable for actions.
State House/Cabinet

Minister
of Agric

MoFNP

MAL

MCTI

FISP
FRA

Figure 3. Command Network
Source: Authors’ calculations with VisualLyzer from interview data. Actors sized

Who and how to change the system
The current maize system has remained unresponsive to policy change
despite numerous policy recommendations. In order to change the system, the
main actors that need to be targeted for policy change are those actors with
from the aggregated interview results from both the lobbying and command
networks, actors that support, block, or are undecided about policy change
are indicated in green, those that block policy change are indicated in red, while
those that are undecided are indicated in yellow. The size of each actor’s node

have the power to change the system are those that are undecided in terms of
the policy direction they need to take. The actors who want to have the maize
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policies revamped (MoFNP, GTAZ, and civil societies) were found to be not very
From this triangle of actors, MoFNP fully supports policy changes in both
caused by the large unbudgeted expenditures on FRA and FISP, however, it
depends on the actual line ministry (MAL) to indicate which policies need to
change. The Executive and MAL seem to be undecided when it comes to changing
policy on FRA and FISP, as we continue to witness these programmes becoming
larger and more ineffective. The Executive was said to remain undecided, as
some of its members believe that FRA and FISP are key to winning the electoral
rural vote.
Policy Position Legend
Undecided

State House/Cabinet

Block Policy Change
Support Policy Change

MCTI
FRA
Minister
of Agric

MoFNP

MAL

Fertilizer
Companies

GTAZ
Millers

ZRFU
Civil Societies

Figure 4. Aggregated Network on Support, Undecided, and Blocking Policy Change
Source: Authors’ calculations with VisualLyzer from interview data. Actors sized

The majority of those interviewed indicated that there were opposing
unequivocally. They said that as long as there is something to be gained from
the status quo, people tend to protect it. This rent seeking behaviour is said to
be obstructing change. The consensus view of those interviewed suggested
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For instance, the stalling of the implementation of the e-voucher in preference
for the traditional FISP was ascribed to a small group within MAL protecting
their interest in the FISP tendering, transportation, and distribution processes.
The enactment of the Agricultural Marketing Bill has also stalled because the
stakeholders advocated for the inclusion of the Agricultural Marketing Council
to deal with marketing issues. However, some of MAL’s technical staff perceived
this as a threat to their jobs and ability to control the agricultural sector, hence,
The critical question is how we can change this way of thinking. Without full
the maize policies because they are crucial in the policy formulation process.
Any hesitation on their part tends to delay or derail the implementation of good
policies. It was noted by some respondents that as long as the message from the
The analysis of the responses from the key informants also show that the
millers, big fertiliser companies, and ZNFU seem to be the main actors blocking
policy change (see Figure 4.) because they tend to lobby for policies that have
on the sector. In addition, with access to both the resident and Minister of
Agriculture their voices tend to be heard over others.
Conclusion
The consistent interference in the market means that the expansion in
production is economically ineffective. The productivity level achieved as
a result of encouraging maize production by small farmers and by paying
time cheaper, to buy maize on the international futures markets rather than
to produce it domestically. Similarly, the practice of subsidising fertiliser –
run plant such as Nitrogen Chemicals of Zambia – would continue to undermine
the potential for the expansion of domestic input industries and burden the
national treasury.
In order to bring about long-lasting changes to the maize marketing policies
in Zambia, there is a need for strong collective action at the highest level,
especially with the command triangle. The Executive need to make a deliberate
effort to depoliticise the maize sector in order to achieve broad-based growth
in the agricultural sector. This is because any random pronouncement by the
Executive at any fora usually becomes policy; Ministries of Agriculture and
Finance are then forced to implement such ad hoc policies which often defy
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empirical evidence. In addition, the sector requires consistency, beginning with
the minister’s position. The current situation where ministers are frequently
are more political rather than based on the experience and contribution the
person would bring to the sector.
Currently, actors are seen to push their agendas independently and decisions
affecting the different actors are not coordinated. This lack of coordination
perpetuates the status quo. Thus, to have meaningful progress in policy changes,
there is need for sector actors to come together and push for policy reform in a
coordinated fashion especially in areas where their interests align. For instance,
we found that there was some consensus regarding the urgent need to reform
FISP by adopting an e-voucher system in order to include more players and
reduce government expenditure on the programme while at the same time
together and agree on the need for the creation of a commodity exchange, an
innovation that the government can use to meet the country’s food security and
poverty reduction objectives without disbanding FRA. Together they managed
to convince the government to issue the Statutory Instrument (SI 59) required
making the exchange operational. What remains is to demonstrate that FRA can
be a big player in the commodity exchange because instead of procuring maize
grain directly from farmers, the agency can do it through the private sector. This

with running a parastatal.
Finally, the decisions in agriculture are made with what are perceived as
gain immediate political mileage through other instruments has not been done
social protection. Therefore, if the government would like to provide effective
social protection, then part of the solution lies in putting more of FISP and
FRA resources to alternative but more effective forms of social protection
programmes. For instance, evidence in other countries has shown that giving
people cash (social cash transfers) that does not distort the market has greater
multiplier effects than distributing a commodity, which crowds out private
sector investment. Therefore, there is need to have farmers who are the main
actors affected by these policies understand the massive costs of the current
assist in pushing for policy reform. In addition, the need for a well informed,
strong, and independent civil society cannot be over emphasized.

20

Antony Chapoto, Olipa Zulu-Mbata, Barak D. Hoffman, Chance Kabaghe, Nicholas
J. Sitko, Auckland Kuteya and Ballard Zulu
Endnotes
1

2

3

any person other than: (a) An African or; (b) Any company or body of persons where
the controlling interest was held by Africans. With this background and the continued
obstacles to the formation of cooperatives by Africans, it was not surprising that the
Northern Rhodesia Farmers’ Union (NRF.U) at Independence in 1964 was essentially a
union for the European commercial farmers. It was recognised as the only representative
organisation for the farming community in the country (see Öjermark and Chabala, 1994).
Net-Map has been applied on studies in International Trade and Policy Reform and
Governance (see for example, Aberman and Edelman (2014); Raabe et al. (2010)).
The communication structure remains the same to date, only that the line ministry in
charge of the policy proposal contacts the relevant ministry as opposed to it being done by

4

can lobby when it comes to policy shifts and changes.
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Appendix
Public Institutions

1.

Food Reserve Agency (FRA)

2.

Fertiliser Input Support Programme (FISP)

3.

Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock (MAL)

4.

Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock Stock
Monitoring Committee

5.

Minister of Agriculture

6.

Ministry of Commerce Trade and Industry (MCTI)

7.

Ministry of Finance and National Planning (MoFNP)

8.

Parliamentary Committee on Agriculture and Lands

9.

Parliament

10. Cabinet
11. State House
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Private Institutions

12. Research Institutions
13. Zambia National Farmers’ Union (ZNFU)
14. Grain Traders Association of Zambia (GTAZ)
15. Millers
16. Zambia Agricultural Commodities Exchange
(ZAMACE)
17. World Food Programme (WFP)

Regional Bodies

18. Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
(COMESA)
19. Southern African Development Community (SADC)

Others

20. Consumers
21. Retailers
22. Small-scale farmers
23. Commercial farmers
24. Commercial banks
25. Civil societies

Source: Authors’ compilation
Table A2. Summary of Key Agriculture Sector Policies, 1964 to 2015
Time line

Policy

First Republic (19641972)

• Introduction of fertiliser and consumer maize meal
subsidies in 1971
• Pan-territorial pricing policy implemented.
National Agricultural Marketing Board in 1969 and
later through the Zambia Cooperative Federation
(ZCF).
• Trade restrictions in terms of exchange controls,
quantitative controls, and import and export
restrictions imposed as a way of protecting the
industry.

Second Republic
1972-1991)

Programme (SAP) in 1978 and producer/consumer
subsidies reduced as part of the SAPs.
• Following urban riots, the government reverted to
price controls and subsidy provision in 1987.
• Abolitiont of NAMBOARD in 1989 and partial
liberalisation of the grain markets.
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Third Republic
(1991-2001)

• Accelerated and expanded the reform process by
removing input and price subsidies.
• Exchange controls, quantitative controls, and import
and export restrictions removed.
• Government’s direct involvement in maize marketing
minimised.
• Establishment of the Food Reserve Agency in 1996
through the Food Reserve Agency Act of 1995, to hold
strategic reserves.

Fourth Republic
(2001-2011)

• Introduced the Food Security Pack programme in
2001 to help the most vulnerable households.
• Resumed large-scale distribution of subsidised
fertiliser to registered farmer cooperatives through
the newly introduced Fertiliser Support Programme
(FSP) in 2002/2003.
• Amendment of the Food Reserve Act (No. 20 of 2005),
giving FRA the authority to participate and engage
directly in maize marketing.

Fifth Republic
(2011- to date)

•
•
•
•
•

Recapitalisation of NCZ
Increased FRA buying activities
Increased spending on FISP
Ad hoc maize export policies.
Signing of the Agricultural Credits Act authorising the
use of warehouse receipt system.
• Promise to reform FISP and implement it through the
e-voucher.

Source: Authors’ illustrations.
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